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DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF SE NATSIOS AND AF/SPG  
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY  
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [SU](#) [AU](#) [UN](#)

SUBJECT: LACK OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP CONTINUES TO WEAKEN  
AMIS

Classified By: CDA Roberto Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

11. (C) Recent comments by the Force Commander of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) underscore the disconnect between the political and military arms of the AU and the incoherent leadership that continues to weaken the mission. In an introductory meeting with S/CRS Poloff in El Fasher, Major General Luke Aprezi lamented that AMIS Headquarters in Khartoum had pressed him to begin closing Group Sites and to consolidate his forces to better protect his men. Understanding that consolidation would mean AMIS would appear to be pulling back and abandoning USG-provided property, Aprezi said that he had resisted these orders. Instead, he sought advice from Pacific Architects and Engineering (PAE), the contractor that maintains the camps. Aprezi said that to his surprise, the PAE representative had contacted the AU in Addis Ababa, which had then demanded to know why he was trying to close Group Sites. No further decision was made on the closures.

12. (S) Aprezi went on to recount a recent conversation he had had with General Ahmed Al Dabi, the Sudanese Government's Security Coordinator for Darfur, and intimated the Government may soon be moving to freeze out the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories from political negotiations. Aprezi led Poloff into a noisy parking lot and explained that his "life would not be worth much" if it became known that he was sharing information about the Sudanese Government's intentions. He implied that he was unable to provide this information to the AU.

13. (S) The Force Commander claimed that Al Dabi had told him that the Verification Exercise to enumerate the number and location of DPA signatories would be completed by mid-May. Soon after, the Sudanese Government would fold the signatories of the DPA and the Declaration of Commitment (DoC) into the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), begin distributing non-military assistance promised under the DPA, and close the political door on any further negotiations with the non-signatories. Despite recent reports of troop concentrations, Aprezi did not interpret Al Dabi's remarks to mean that the Sudanese Government was preparing an offensive against the DPA non-signatories.

14. (C) COMMENT: The inability of the AU to decide the status of the Group Sites and its lack of clear channels of political reporting are at the heart of the mission's overall weakness. Some military experts on the ground assert that force protection could be increased by the closure of a limited number of Group Sites. Sortoni and Umm Baru, for example, depend on water sources several kilometers away,

requiring regular visits that increase opportunities for attacks against AMIS soldiers. Regardless of the ultimate decision on the Group Sites, the larger problem is the lack of leadership within the AU. The AU Mission is unable to take stock of reporting from the field, analyze the situation on the ground, and react. In the absence of a permanent Head of Mission in Khartoum and a capable Deputy Head of Mission in El Fasher, Aprezi has often drifted into the political realm, which has caused confusion and diluted his effectiveness as a military commander. Aprezi's successor will confront similar obstacles until the arrival of a permanent AU Head of Mission and a committed Deputy Head of Mission. END COMMENT.

POWERS